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1 Introduction
This note presents two simple proofs of a theorem by Harris (1985b) on
the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in continuous games of perfect
information.
Broadly, both proofs start to solve a simple related problem, which is
then extended to the case in which we are interested. In fact, in our first
proof we consider a class of games in which it it easy to prove the existence
of equilibria; then, we show that any continuous game can be approximated
by games in that class and that limit points of equilibrium outcomes of
the approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the original game.
Similarly, in our second proof we consider a set of outcomes for which it is
easy to show its non-emptiness and then we show that this set is a subset
of the set of equilibrium outcomes. In both cases, it follows that the set
of equilibrium outcomes is nonempty and a perfect equilibrium can then be
constructed from any equilibrium outcome.
In both proofs we start by focusing on games with a finite horizon. Our
first proof considers simple games, that is, games in which all players’ payoff
functions are finitely-valued. For such games it is easy to show that they
have a perfect equilibrium, which can be done using the standard backward
induction argument. The point is that we can always find an optimal choice
for any player given an initial history and the strategies of the others since
there is only finitely many values that the payoff function can take.
We then extend this result to continuous games. We first approximate
the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, in a
way that is standard in measure and integration theory (see, for example,
Wheeden and Zygmund (1977)). This approximation induces a sequence of
games with the following property: each game in the sequence differs from
the original game only on the payoff function and it has a nonempty set of
equilibrium outcomes. We then show that the sequence of the closure of each
of those sets shrinks to the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game,
implying that the original game has a nonempty, compact set of equilibrium
outcome.
Although inspired by the work of Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson
(1990), this proof differs from theirs in that the only space we discretize is
the range of players’ payoff functions. This lead us to consider simple games,
which are simple enough to prove easily the existence of a perfect equilibrium.
Furthermore, it allows us to avoid changing players’ action spaces, which
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simplifies the proof of existence of equilibria in general continuous games
and dispenses with metric spaces assumptions.
Our second proof relies on the set of nice outcomes introduced by Hellwig
and Leininger (1987). It easy to show that the set of such outcomes is
nonempty since these outcomes can be characterized as the set of solutions
of a maximization problem of a continuous function on a nonempty compact
space.
We then use the non-emptiness of the set of nice outcomes to show the
existence of an equilibrium outcome. This is done by showing that the set
of nice outcome is a subset of the set of equilibrium outcomes. The intuition
behind this results is that an equilibrium outcome also solves a maximization
problem, but a more restrictive one.
Our second proof is considerably simpler than the one of Hellwig and
Leininger (1987). This happens because their use it to obtain a stronger
conclusion, namely, the existence of a measurable perfect equilibria. However,
we note that, by dropping this goal, not only do we simplify the argument,
but also we can dispenses with the assumption that players’ action spaces
are metric spaces. In fact, both it and our first proof dispense with the
assumption that they are Hausdorff spaces used originally by Harris (1985b).
Both proofs rely on a continuity argument on how the equilibrium out-
comes of subgames change with the initial history defining it. This argument
is done in Lemma 3 below using our approximation by simple games, where
we show that accumulation points of equilibrium outcomes of approximat-
ing simple games are equilibrium outcomes of the limiting continuous game.
A similar argument can be used to show that the correspondence mapping
initial histories into equilibrium outcomes of the corresponding subgame is
both closed and upper hemicontinuous.
2 Games of Perfect Information
Our notation follows closely the one used by Harris (1985b). There is a
possibly infinite set of time periods t = 1, . . . , T ≤ ∞. To each time period,
we associate a different player.1 For all 1 ≤ t ≤ T , player t chooses an action
which can be represented by an element of St. An history of the game is an
1By the single deviation property (see Harris (1985b, Lemma 1)), the assumption that
each players moves only once is without loss of generality.
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element of
S =
T
upslope
t=0
St,
where S0 = {0} is included for notational convenience. Given k ≥ 0, x =
(xk, . . . , xT ) ∈ Sk × · · · × ST , and t ≥ k, λtx = (xk, . . . , xt) denotes the
components of x from k until t, and µtx = (xt, xt+1, . . . , xT ) the sequence of
outcomes from t onwards.
A game of perfect information is a pair G = (H,P ) where H is a non-
empty subset of S, P = (P1, . . . , PT ) and
Pt : H → R
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . The set H denotes the set of all possible histories in the
game G and the function Pt is player t’s payoff function.
For all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ H, let
At(λt−1x) = {yt : y ∈ H, λt−1y = λt−1x}
denote the set of outcomes that are possible in period t given the history
λt−1x. Note that At(λt−1x) defines a correspondence At : λt−1H ⇒ Ht and
that graph(At) = λtH. In particular, graph(AT ) = H.
When player t chooses, it is with perfect information on previous choices
by players 1 up to t − 1 and he can choose any feasible choice. Thus, a
strategy for player t is a function
ft : λt−1H → St
such that ft(λt−1x) ∈ At(λt−1x) for all x ∈ H.
A strategy profile f is a vector of individual strategies: f = (f1, . . . , fT ).
Let F (H) denote the set of all strategy profiles (or strategies, for short),
and F t(H) denote the set of all player t’s strategies. If ht ∈ F t(H), and
f ∈ F (H), then f \ ht denotes the strategy resulting from replacing player
t’s strategy f t by ht.
Given f ∈ F , x ∈ H and t ∈ N, the history resulting if f is employed from
period t+ 1 onwards after an initial history λtx is denoted by α[f, x, t] ∈ H.
A strategy f is a perfect equilibrium of the game G = (H,P ) if
Pt(α[f, x, t]) ≥ Pt(α[f \ ht, x, t])
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T , ht ∈ F t(H), x ∈ H.
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Every initial history of a game with perfect information induces another
such games. Formally, if 1 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ λt−1H, let Ht(x) = {y ∈ H :
λt−1y = x} be the set of possible histories which can follow the initial history
x. The subgame starting at x is the game Gt(x) with perfect information
defined by (Ht(x), P|Ht(x)).
If 1 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ λt−1H, f is a perfect equilibrium of a game of perfect
information Gt(x) the history y ∈ µtH defined by yt = ft(x) and yk =
fk(x, λk−1y) for all k ≥ t + 1 is called an equilibrium outcome of f . The set
of all equilibrium outcomes of Gt(x) is denoted by Πt(x) ⊆ µtH.
Let G = (H,P ) be a game with perfect information. We say that G is a
game with finite horizon if T is finite; otherwise, G is a game with infinite
horizon. A game G is simple if Pt is simple for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and is continuous
if for all t = 1, . . . , T ,
1. St is a compact topological space,
2. Pt is continuous,
3. At : λt−1 ⇒ Ht is lower hemicontinuous and
4. H is a closed subset of S.
3 Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section we characterize the set of equilibrium outcomes. We focus on
equilibrium outcomes because it is easier to show the non-emptiness of the
set of equilibrium outcomes than to establish the existence of an equilibrium
strategy directly. The reason is that the set of equilibrium outcomes is com-
pact in all continuous games, while the set of equilibrium strategies typically
is not (see Harris (1985a, proposition 4)).
Let T <∞ and for all x ∈ λT−1H, define
ET (x) = {y ∈ AT (x) : PT (x, y) ≥ PT (x, z), for all z ∈ AT (x)}.
The set ET (x) gives the equilibrium paths of the one-player game formed by
player T with action space AT (x) and payoff function y 7→ PT (x, y). Assume
that Ek(x) has been defined for all k = t+ 1, . . . , T and x ∈ λk−1(x). Then,
define
Et(x) = {y ∈ µtH : µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x, yt) and for all z ∈ At(x) there exists
w ∈ Et+1(x, z) such that Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w)}.
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Lemma 1 then shows that Et(x) is the set of equilibrium paths of the subgame
starting at x.
Lemma 1 If G is a game with perfect information with finite horizon, then
Πt(x) = Et(x),
for all t = 1, . . . , T and all x ∈ λt−1H.
Proof. We start by showing that Et(x) ⊆ Πt(x) for all t = 1, . . . , T and
all x ∈ λt−1H.
The proof is by induction. For k = T , this is obvious. So, assume that
Ek(x) ⊆ Πk(x) for all k = t + 1, . . . , T and all x ∈ λk−1H. Let x ∈ λt−1H
and y ∈ Et(x). Then, µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x, yt) ⊆ Πt+1(x, yt). Thus, there exists
a perfect equilibrium (f¯t+1, . . . , f¯T ) of G(x) satisfying f¯k(x, λk−1y) = yk for
all k ≥ t + 1. Define ft(x) = yt and fk(s) = f¯k(s) for all s ∈ H such that
λts = (x, yt) and all k ≥ t+ 1.
Let z ∈ At(x). Then, there exists w ∈ Et+1(x, z) ⊆ Πt(x, z) such that
Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w). Hence, there exists a perfect equilibrium (f˜t+1, . . . , f˜T )
of G(x) satisfying f˜k(x, z, λk−1w) = wk for all k ≥ t+1. Define fk(s) = f˜k(s)
for all s ∈ H such that λts = (x, zt) and all k ≥ t+ 1.
By construction, (ft, . . . , fT ) is a perfect equilibrium of G(x) satisfying
fk(x, λk−1y) = yk for all k ≥ t. This implies that y ∈ Πt(x).
Finally, we show that Πt(x) ⊆ Et(x) for all t = 1, . . . , T and all x ∈ λt−1H,
again by induction.
The case k = T is obvious. So, assume that Πk(x) ⊆ Ek(x) for all k =
t + 1, . . . , T and all x ∈ λk−1H. Let x ∈ λt−1H and y ∈ Πt(x). Then, there
exists a perfect equilibrium (ft, . . . , fT ) of G(x) such that yk = fk(λk−1(x, y))
for all k ≥ t.
Since µt+1y ∈ Πt+1(x, yt), then µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x, yt). Let z ∈ At(x) and
consider w defined by wt+1 = ft+1(x, z) and wk = fk(x, z, λk−1w) for all
k > t+1. Then, w ∈ Π(x, z) and so w ∈ Et+1(x, z). Letting gt : λt−1H → St
be defined by gt(x) = z and gt(s) = ft(s) for all s 6= x, then α[f \ gt, x, t] =
(x, z, w). Since we have that α[f, x, t] = (x, y), it follows that Pt(x, y) ≥
Pt(x, z, w). Hence, y ∈ Et(x).
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4 Approximation by Simple Functions and
Harris’ Theorem
In this section we show that any simple game with perfect information with
finite horizon has a perfect equilibrium. This result is then used to establish
the existence of a perfect equilibrium in any continuous game with perfect
information with finite horizon.
4.1 Existence of Perfect Equilibria
Let G = (H,P ) be a game of perfect information with a finite horizon, and
assume that for all t = 1, . . . , T , Pt(H) ⊂ [0, 1). For all t = 1, . . . , T and
k ∈ N, let P kt : H → R be defined by
P kt (h) =
j − 1
2k
if
j − 1
2k
≤ Pt(h) < j
2k
, (1)
for j = 1, . . . , 2k. Define Gk = (H,P
k), for all k ∈ N. The sequence {P k} has
the following important properties: for all t = 1, . . . , T and all k ∈ N,
1.
∥∥P kt − Pt∥∥∞ ≤ 12k ;
2. For all h, l ∈ H, Pt(h) ≥ Pt(l) implies P kt (h) ≥ P kt (l);
3. For all h, l ∈ H, P k+1t (h) ≥ P k+1t (l) implies P kt (h) ≥ P kt (l); and
4. P kt is a simple function.
This last property allows us to solve the game Gk by backwards induction,
and thus show that it has a perfect equilibrium. More generaly, this is a
consequence of the fact that every simple game with finite horizon has a
perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 2 Every simple game with perfect information with finite horizon
has a perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let G be a simple game with perfect information with finite
horizon. We will prove the lemma by backward induction.
Let k ∈ N. Let x ∈ λT−1H. Since PT is simple, then {PT (x, y) : y ∈
AT (x)} is finite, and so there exists y∗ ∈ AT (x) that maximizes y 7→ PT (x, y)
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in AT (x). Thus, define fT (x) = y
∗. This defines an optimal strategy fT for
player T .
Suppose that we have defined fn : λn−1H → Sn such that fn(x) ∈ An(x)
and
Pn(α[(fn+1, . . . , fT ), (x, fn(x)), n+ 1]) ≥ Pn(α[(fn+1, . . . , fT ), (x, z), n+ 1])
for all n = t+ 1, . . . , T , x ∈ λn−1H and z ∈ An(x).
Let x ∈ λt−1H. Since Pt is simple, then the set
{Pt(α[(ft+1, . . . , fT ), (x, z), t+ 1]) : z ∈ At(x)}
is finite, and so there exists z∗ that maximizes
z 7→ Pt(α[(ft+1, . . . , fT ), (x, z), t+ 1])
in At(x). Thus, define ft(x) = z
∗. This defines an optimal strategy ft for
player t.
Let f = (f1, . . . , ft). Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ λt−1H and gt ∈ F t. Since
α[f, x, t] = α[(ft+1, . . . , fT ), (x, ft(x)), t+ 1] and
α[f \ gt, x, t] = α[(ft+1, . . . , fT ), (x, gt(x)), t+ 1],
it follows that Pt(α[f, x, t]) ≥ Pt(α[f \ gt, x, t]). Thus, f = (f1, . . . , fT ) is a
perfect equilibrium.
We will prove Harris’ theorem by approximating a given game G by a se-
quence of games {Gk}∞k=1 as defined above. In fact, this will be a consequence
of Theorem 1 below, which shows that the set of equilibrium outcomes of Gk
converges to the set of equilibrium outcomes of G.
Theorem 1 If G = (H,P ) is a continuous game of perfect information with
finite horizon, then
Et(x) =
∞⋂
k=1
Ekt (x) =
∞⋂
k=1
Ekt (x)
for all t = 1, . . . , T and x ∈ λt−1H.
Proof. First note that because H is compact and Pt is continuous for all
t, there is no loss in generality by assuming that Pt(H) ⊂ [0, 1) for all t. For
k ∈ N, let Gk be as defined above.
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We show first that Et(x) ⊆ ∩∞k=1Ekt (x) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ λt−1H.
This follows from the second property of the sequence {P k}. For player T ,
this is obvious: if x ∈ λT−1H and y ∈ ET (x), then PT (x, y) ≥ PT (x, z) for
all z ∈ AT (x) and so P kT (x, y) ≥ P kT (x, z) for all k ∈ N. Thus, y ∈ EkT (x) for
all k ∈ N.
So, suppose that En(x) ⊆ ∩∞k=1Ekn(x) for all n ≥ t+1 and x ∈ λn−1H. Let
x ∈ λt−1H, y ∈ Et(x) and k ∈ N. Then, µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x, yt) ⊆ Ekt+1(x, yt).
Let z ∈ At(x). Then, there exists w ∈ Et+1(x, z) ⊆ Ekt+1(x, z) such that
Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w). Hence, P kt (x, y) ≥ P kt (x, z, w) and so y ∈ Ekt (x).
We show next that ∩∞k=1Ekt (x) ⊆ Et(x) for all t = 1, . . . , T and x ∈ λt−1H.
Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ λt−1H and y ∈ ∩∞k=1Ekt (x). Then, for each k ∈ N, there
a net {ykj }j∈Jk ⊆ Ekt (x) converging to y. Letting yk = y and xkj = xk = x for
all k ∈ N and j ∈ Jk, it follows from Lemma 3 that y ∈ Et(x).
The following lemma is used in Theorem 1 and constitutes the crucial
argument in its proof.
Lemma 3 Let G be a continuous game with perfect information with finite
horizon.
Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T , x ∈ λt−1H and y ∈ λtH. Let {xk}k∈K and {yk}k∈K
be nets converging to x and y, respectively. Let N : K → N be such that
N(k) → ∞. For all k ∈ K, let {xkj}j∈Jk and {ykj }j∈Jk be nets such that
xkj →j xk, ykj →j yk and ykj ∈ EN(k)t (xkj ) for all j ∈ Jk. Then, y ∈ Et(x).
Proof. The proof is by (backward) induction. In the case of player
T , note first that yk ∈ AT (xk) for all k ∈ K and so y ∈ AT (x). This
follows since H is closed and graph(AT ) = H. So, it remains to show that
PT (x, y) ≥ PT (x, z) for all z ∈ AT (x).
Let z ∈ AT (x). By Lemma 5, there exists a subnet {x˜m}m∈M of {xk}k∈K
and a corresponding net {zm}m∈M such that zm ∈ AT (x˜m) for all m ∈ M
and zm → z. Let α :M → K be the admissible function defining the subnet,
i.e., x˜m = xα(m) for all m ∈ M . Let {y˜m}m∈M be the corresponding subnet
of {yk}k∈K .
Let m ∈M and x˜mj = xα(m)j for all j ∈ J˜m = Jα(m). Then, x˜mj → x˜m. By
Lemma 5, there exist a subnet {x¯ml }l∈Lm of {x˜mj }j∈J˜m and a corresponding
net {zml }l∈Lm such that zml ∈ AT (x¯ml ) for all l ∈ Lm and zml → zm. Let
{y¯ml }l∈Lm be the corresponding subnet of {y˜m}m∈M .
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Letm ∈M and l ∈ Lm. Since y¯ml ∈ EN(α(m))t (x¯ml ), then PN(α(m))T (x¯ml , y¯ml ) ≥
P
N(α(m))
T (x¯
m
l , z
m
l ) and so
PT (x¯
m
l , y¯
m
l ) ≥ PT (x¯ml , zml )−
2
2N(α(m))
.
Hence, PT (x˜
m, y˜m) ≥ PT (x˜m, zm)− 2/2N(α(m)) and so, we obtain PT (x, y) ≥
PT (x, z) .
2 Thus, y ∈ ET (x).
Suppose that the claim is true for all n ≥ t+ 1. Let x ∈ λt−1H, y ∈ λtH
and {xkj}j, {ykj }j, {xk}k and {yk}k be as in the statement of the claim. Since
(xk, ykt ) → (x, yt), µt+1yk → µt+1y and for all k, µt+1ykj ∈ EN(k)t+1 (xkj , ykjt)
for all j, (xkj , y
k
jt) → (xk, ykt ), and µt+1ykj → µt+1yk, it follows that µt+1y ∈
Et+1(x, yt).
Let z ∈ At(x). By Lemma 5, there exists a subnet {x˜m}m∈M of {xk}k∈K
and a corresponding net {zm}m∈M such that zm ∈ AT (x˜m) for all m ∈ M
and zm → z. Let α :M → K be the admissible function defining the subnet,
i.e., x˜m = xα(m) for all m ∈ M . Let {y˜m}m∈M be the corresponding subnet
of {yk}k∈K .
Let m ∈M and x˜mj = xα(m)j for all j ∈ J˜m = Jα(m). Then, x˜mj → x˜m. By
Lemma 5, there exist a subnet {x¯ml }l∈Lm of {x˜mj }j∈J˜m and a corresponding
net {zml }l∈Lm such that zml ∈ AT (x¯ml ) for all l ∈ Lm and zml → zm. Let
{y¯ml }l∈Lm be the corresponding subnet of {y˜m}m∈M .
Let m ∈ M and l ∈ Lm. Since y¯ml ∈ EN(α(m))t (x¯ml ), then there exists
wml ∈ EN(α(m))t+1 (x¯ml , zml ) such that PN(α(m))T (x¯ml , y¯ml ) ≥ PN(α(m))T (x¯ml , zml , wml ).
Since µt+1H is compact, we may assume that {wml }l∈Lm converges; let wm
denote one of its limit points. Again, taking a subnet if necessary, we may
assume that {wm}m∈M converges and let w be one of its limit points.
Since wml ∈ EN(α(m))t+1 (x¯ml , zml ) for all m ∈ M and l ∈ Lm, x¯ml → x˜m,
zml → zm, x˜m → x, zm → z and N(α(m)) → ∞, then w ∈ Et+1(x).
Furthermore, we have that
PT (x¯
m
l , y¯
m
l ) ≥ PT (x¯ml , zml , wml )−
2
2N(α(m))
,
which implies that PT (x, y) ≥ PT (x, z, w). Thus, y ∈ Et(x).
2Note that 2/2N(α(m)) converges to zero since N(α(m)) converges to infinity. The latter
assertion can be shown as follows: For all n ∈ N, there exists k0 ∈ K such that k º k0
implies that N(k) ≥ n. Also, there is m0 ∈M such that m º m0 implies that α(m) º k0.
Hence, for all m º m0, it follows that N(α(m)) ≥ n.
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Theorem 1 gives a characterization of subgame perfect equilibrium paths
of G in terms of the equilibrium paths of the approximating games, and
provides an algorithm for their computation. Also, it follows immediately
from Theorem 1 that Et(x) is compact and closed for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and
x ∈ λt−1H.
We can derive further properties of the set of equilibrium outcomes using
Lemma 3. Note that the set Et(x), with 1 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ λt−1H, defines
a correspondence Et : λt−1H ⇒ µtH. This correspondence assigns to every
initial history the set of equilibrium outcomes of the corresponding outcomes.
A simple modification of Lemma 3 (replace E
N(k)
t (x
k
j ) by Et(x
k
j ) in the its
statement) together with Theorem 7.1.16 of Klein and Thompson (1984) then
imply the following properties for Et.
Theorem 2 If G is a continuous game with perfect information with finite
horizon, then the correspondence Et is closed-valued, closed and upper hemi-
continuous for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Another important question is whether or not Et is nonempty-valued,
which is answered affirmatively by Harris’ Theorem. As we show below, it
follows easily from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 3 (Harris) Every continuous game with perfect information with
finite horizon has a perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let G be a continuous game with perfect information with finite
horizon. For all k ∈ N, let Gk be as defined above. By Lemma 2, it follows
that Ek1 is nonempty. Since, for all k ∈ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T and h, l ∈ H,
P k+1t (h) ≥ P k+1t (l) implies P kt (h) ≥ P kt (l), it follows that Ek+1t (x) ⊆ Ekt (x)
for all x ∈ λt−1H.
Note that S1×· · ·×ST is compact. Since Ek1 is a nonempty, closed subset
of S1 × · · · × ST for all k ∈ N, it follows that ∩∞k=1Ek1 is a nonempty subset
of S1 × · · · × ST (see Kelley (1955, theorem 1, page 136)). Hence, it follows
from Theorem 1 that E1 is nonempty.
Remark 1 Note that the above Theorem dispenses with the assumption used
by Harris (1985b) that St is Hausdorff for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
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4.2 Relation with Hellwig et al. (1990)
Our approach in this section is similar to that of Hellwig, Leininger, Reny,
and Robson (1990). In fact, both have the same structure:
1. Find a class of finite horizon games of perfect information in which it
easy to prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium;
2. Approximate general games with a finite horizon with games in that
class;
3. Show that the limit of equilibrium outcomes of the approximating
games is an equilibrium outcome of the original game;
4. Construct a perfect equilibrium from the equilibrium outcome; and
5. Extend the existence result for games with an infinite horizon.
Despite using the same structure, our proof differs from theirs. It starts
by differing on the class of easy games we consider: games with finite-valued
(i.e., simple) payoff functions in our case and finite-action games in theirs.
Note, however, that all payoff functions are finite-valued in a finite-action
game and that this is enough to show the existence of perfect equilibrium
easily by backward induction. This shows that the ability to prove existence
of equilibria easily does not really depend on whether the action space is
finite or not but rather on whether players’ payoff functions are finite-valued
or not.
Step 3 is the crucial step in the proof of existence of perfect equilibria
in general finite horizon games. How easy this argument is depends on how
good are the approximations we consider. The approximation we use is
particularly strong, not only because payoff functions converge uniformly,
but also because the ordering of outcomes is refined along the sequence of
the approximations. This makes the proof of Theorems 1 and 2 simple.
Furthermore, the proof of Lemma 3, which is similar to part of Theorem 1
of Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson (1990), is also simplified since, in
contrast to them, all approximating games have the same action space.
We note that both approaches can be further related by constructing an
approximating sequence of simple games from an approximating sequence of
finite-action games. Let G be a finite horizon game of perfect information.
Assume that St is a compact metric space for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and let dt denote
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the metric on St. For all k ∈ N, let Skt be a finite subset of St and assume
that εkt = maxx∈St miny∈Skt dt(x, y) → 0. Then, the family {Bεkt (y)}y∈Skt of
open balls with radius εkt around all points of S
k
t covers of St and can be
transformed into a disjoint collection {Bkt (y)}y∈Skt as follows: order Skt , and
let Bkt (y1) = Bεkt (y1) and B
k
t (yj) = Bεkt (yj) \
(
∪j−1l=1Bεkt (xl)
)
, for all j ≥ 2.
Then, for all x = (x0, x1, . . . , xt) ∈ H define P kt (x) = Pt(s) if xt ∈ Bkt (yt) for
all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . It is clear that {P kt }k is a sequence of simple functions that
converges uniformly to Pt for all t. However, in general, it does not satisfy
the additional property that the ordering of outcomes is refined along the
sequence, a property that simplifies the proof.
Despite being more general, using simple games rather than discrete
games allows us to address the existence question without having to use
metric space techniques. We note, however, that our proof also uses a dis-
cretization argument on a metric space, but this is done on the range of
players’ payoff functions, which is a subset of the real numbers. Since this is
the only space we need to discretize (in particular, we do not have to change
players’ action spaces), we can dispense with the metric space assumptions
they make.
5 Nice Outcomes and Harris’ Theorem
An alternative way to establish the existence of an equilibrium outcome
is through the use of nice outcomes, introduced by Hellwig and Leininger
(1987). This is so, because as we show below, the set of nice outcomes is a
subset of the set of equilibrium outcomes. Since one easily shows that the
set of nice outcomes is nonempty, it follows that a perfect equilibrium exists.
5.1 Nice Equilibrium Outcomes
Let G be a continuous game with perfect information with finite horizon.
For all x ∈ λT−1H, define ΦT (x) = ET (x) and ΦT (x) = {y ∈ AT (x) :
(x, y) ∈ graph(ΦT )}. By remark 2, it follows that ET (x) = ΦT (x) and that
the correspondence ΦT : λT−1H ⇒ µTH is closed. Assume that Φk(x) has
been defined and that the correspondence Φk : λk−1H ⇒ µkH is closed for
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all k = t+ 1, . . . , T and x ∈ λk−1(x). Then, define
Φt(x) = {y ∈ µtH : µt+1y ∈ Φt+1(x, yt) and Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w)
for all z ∈ At(x) and w ∈ Φt+1(x, z)}
and Φt(x) = {y ∈ µtH : (x, y) ∈ graph(Φt)}. The correspondence Φt has the
following important properties.
Theorem 4 If G is a continuous game with perfect information with finite
horizon, then Φt(x) is nonempty and Φt(x) ⊆ Et(x) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and
x ∈ λt−1H,
Proof. Let 1 ≤ t ≤ T and x ∈ λt−1H. Define a correspondence Λt :
Ht ⇒ µt+1H by Λt(yt) = Φt+1(x, yt) and let Ct = graph(Λt). Then, Ct is a
closed, and hence compact, subset of upslopeTk=t Sk. Since Φt(x) equals the set of
solutions to the problem
max
y∈Ct
Pt(x, y),
it follows by Weierstrass’ Theorem (see Kelley (1955, Exercise 5.A.(b))) that
Φt(x) is nonempty. Hence, Φt(x) is nonempty.
We prove that Φt(x) ⊆ Et(x) by (backward) induction. We have that
ET (x) = ΦT (x) for all x ∈ λT−1H. Hence, assume that Φk(x) ⊆ Ek(x) for
all k = t+ 1, . . . , T and x ∈ λk−1H.
Let x ∈ λt−1H and y ∈ Φt(x). Then, µt+1y ∈ Φt+1(x, yt) ⊆ Et+1(x, yt).
Let z ∈ At(x) and let w ∈ Φt+1(x, z). Then, Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w) since
y ∈ Φt(x). Thus, y ∈ Et(x).
This implies that graph(Φt) ⊆ graph(Et). Since graph(Et) is closed, it
follows that Φt(x) ⊆ Et(x).
Clearly, Theorem 4 shows that E1 is nonempty and so G has a perfect
equilibrium. Thus, we obtain an alternative proof Harris’ Theorem. Again,
we emphasized that this proof also shows that we can dispense with the
assumption that St is Hausdorff for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
5.2 Relation with Hellwig and Leininger (1987)
Our approach in this section is clearly related with that of Hellwig and
Leininger (1987). The proof relies on finding a special subset of the equi-
librium outcomes, whose non-emptiness is easy to establish. One such set is
the set of of nice outcomes introduced by Hellwig and Leininger (1987).
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However, since the set of nice outcomes is typically a proper subset of the
set of equilibrium outcomes, they do not provide a characterization of these.
Hence, nice outcomes cannot be used to study the continuity properties of
the correspondence mapping initial histories into equilibrium outcomes of the
corresponding subgame.
We note that Hellwig and Leininger (1987) have introduced such set in
order to show the existence measurable perfect equilibria, a question that
we do not address here. Since we care only about existence of equilibria
and not about its regularity properties, we obtain a considerably simpler
proof. Furthermore, our proof dispenses with metric spaces techniques used
by them, and in fact, dispenses with the assumption that the outcome space
is Hausdorff.
6 Games with an Infinite Horizon
In this section, we extent our result to the case of a countable number of
players using a “truncation argument” similar to the one used by Harris
(1985b, section 4.4, page 624).3 Due to this, we shall be brief.
Let G be a continuous game with perfect information with an infinite
horizon. For all n, t ∈ N and x ∈ λt−1(x), let Ent (x) = µtH if t > n and
Ent (x) = {y ∈ µtH : µt+1y ∈ Ent+1(x, yt) and for all z ∈ At(x) there exists
w ∈ Ent+1(x, z) such that Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w)}
if t ≤ n.
An argument similar to the one used in Section 4 shows that Ent (x) is
nonempty and closed for all n, t ∈ N and x ∈ λt−1H. Furthermore, an easy
inductive argument establishes that En+1t (x) ⊆ Ent (x) for all n, t ∈ N and
x ∈ λt−1H. Hence, Et(x) = ∩∞n=1Ent (x) is nonempty, closed and compact for
all t ∈ N and x ∈ λt−1H. Furthermore, Et(x) can be described as in Section
3.
Lemma 4 If G is a continuous game with perfect information with an infi-
nite horizon, then
Et(x) = {y ∈ µtH : µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x, yt) and for all z ∈ At(x) there exists
w ∈ Et+1(x, z) such that Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w)}
3See also Bo¨rgers (1989) and Bo¨rgers (1991) for a related approach.
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for all t ∈ N and x ∈ λt−1H.
Proof. Let t ∈ N and x ∈ λt−1H. Let y ∈ Et(x). Then, y ∈ ∩nEnt (x).
Hence, µt+1y ∈ Ent+1(x) for all n, and so µt+1y ∈ Et+1(x).
Let z ∈ At(x). Then, for all n, there exists wn ∈ Ent+1(x) such that
Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, wn). Since {wn}n ⊆ upslope∞k=t+1 Sk and upslope∞k=t+1 Sk is compact,
then there exists a converging subnet {w˜j}j∈J of {wn}n. Let w be such that
w˜j → w. Let n ∈ N and j0 ∈ J be such that j º j0 implies N(j) ≥ n. Then,
for all j º j0, w˜j = wN(j) ∈ EN(j)t+1 (x) ⊆ Ent+1(x). Hence, w ∈ Ent+1(x). Since n
is arbitrary, it follows that w ∈ Et+1(x). Furthermore, Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w˜j)
for all j ∈ J implies Pt(x, y) ≥ Pt(x, z, w). Hence, y ∈ Et(x).
The existence of a perfect equilibrium follows from the non-emptiness of
E1 in the standard way (see Harris (1985b), Hellwig and Leininger (1987)
and Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson (1990)). If y ∈ E1, define f1 = y1
and ft(λt−1y) = yt for all t > 1. This already defines f1. To define f2, let
x ∈ λ1H. If x = y1, we already have defined f2(x) = f2(y1) = y2; otherwise,
let w = (w2, w3, . . .) ∈ E2(x) and define f2(x) = w2 and ft(x, λt−1w) = wt
for all t > 2. Proceeding in this way, we define a strategy f , which is clearly
a perfect equilibrium.
7 Concluding Remarks
We presented two simple proofs of the existence of a perfect equilibrium
in games with perfect information. Both share some important elements
with others available. Namely, we focus on the non-emptiness of the set of
equilibrium outcomes in games with a finite horizon. This basic result is
then used to construct a perfect equilibrium strategy and, furthermore, it is
extended to the case of an infinite horizon.
While our argument to extend to the case of an infinite horizon is stan-
dard, our construction of a perfect equilibrium from an equilibrium outcomes
in finite horizon games is not. Typically, this is done by defining the equi-
librium strategies using forward induction. Although this must be the case
with an infinite horizon (since there is no terminal period), it can be done
by backward induction when the horizon is finite and in a similar way as it
is standard in finite-action, finite horizon games with perfect information.
Despite this more transparent construction, our main contributions re-
gard the non-emptiness of the set of equilibrium outcomes. We first establish
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it using an approximation by simple games. Although inspired by the work
of Hellwig, Leininger, Reny, and Robson (1990), it differs from theirs in that
the only space we discretize is the range of players’ payoff functions. This
lead us to consider simple games, which are simple enough to prove easily the
existence of a perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, it allows us to avoid chang-
ing players’ action spaces, which simplifies the proof of existence of equilibria
in general continuous games and dispenses with metric spaces assumptions.
Our second proof relies on the set of nice outcomes introduced by Hellwig
and Leininger (1987). The advantage of focusing on nice outcomes is that
these outcomes can be characterized as the set of solutions of a maximization
problem of a continuous function on a nonempty compact space. This implies
that the set of nice outcomes is nonempty. Since we can further show that
the set nice outcome is a subset of the set of equilibrium outcomes, we obtain
the existence of equilibria.
Both proofs rely on a continuity argument on how the equilibrium out-
comes of subgames change with the initial history defining it. This argument
is done in Lemma 3 below using our approximation by simple games, where
we show that accumulation points of equilibrium outcomes of approximat-
ing simple games are equilibrium outcomes of the limiting continuous game.
A similar argument can be used to show that the correspondence mapping
initial histories into equilibrium outcomes of the corresponding subgame is
both closed and upper hemicontinuous.
A Appendix
In this section we provide the definition of some of the mathematical concepts
we have used. Furthermore, we present a result on lower hemicontinuous
correspondences for which we were unable to find a reference.
The following are standard definitions (see Kelley (1955)). A binary rela-
tion º directs a set D if D is nonempty, º is transitive, reflexive and satisfies
the following property: if m,n ∈ D, then there is p ∈ D such that p º m
and p º n. A net is a pair (S,º) such that S is a function and º directs
the domain of S. It is typically written as {Sn, n ∈ D,º} where D is the
domain of S, or as {Sn}n∈D, leaving the binary relation º implicit.
A net {Sn}n∈D is eventually in a set A if there is m ∈ D such that Sn ∈ A
for all n º m. A net in a topological space (X, τ) converges to x relative to
τ if the net is eventually in each τ – neighborhood of x.
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Given two directed sets E and D, a function N : E → D is admissible if
for all m ∈ D there is n ∈ E with the property that p º n implies N(p) º m.
A net {Tm}m∈E is a subnet of a net {Sn}n∈D if there exists an admissible
function N : E → D such that Tm = SN(m) for all m ∈ E. Clearly, if Sn → s
and {Tm}m∈E is a subnet of {Sn}n∈D, then Tm → s. Subnets are useful
because, in particular, a topological space X is compact if and only if each
net in X has a subnet which converges to some point in X (see Kelley (1955,
Theorem 5.2, p. 136)).
Nets and subnets play in topological spaces an analog role to sequences
and subsequences in metric spaces. For instance, we have that a point s
belongs to the closure of a subset A of a topological space if and only if there
is a net converging to s (see Kelley (1955, Theorem 2.2, p. 66)). Furthermore,
a function f : X → Y , where X and Y are topological spaces, is continuous
if and only if {f(xj)}j∈J converges to f(x) for all x ∈ X and all nets {xj}j∈J
converging to x (Kelley (1955, Theorem 3.1, p. 86)).
Let X and Y be topological spaces. A correspondence ϕ : X ⇒ Y is
upper hemicontinuous if for all x ∈ X, all nets {xj}j∈J in X converging to
x and all open sets G in Y with ϕ(x) ⊆ G, there exists j0 ∈ J such that
ϕ(xj) ⊆ G for all j º j0 (see Klein and Thompson (1984, Theorem 7.1.4, p.
74)).
A correspondence ϕ : X ⇒ Y is lower hemicontinuity if for all x ∈ X, all
nets {xj}j∈J in X converging to x and all open sets G in Y with ϕ(x)∩G 6= ∅,
there exists j0 ∈ J such that ϕ(xj) ∩ G 6= ∅ for all j º j0 (see Klein and
Thompson (1984, Theorem 7.1.7, p. 75)).
The following result concerns lower hemicontinuous correspondences ϕ :
X ⇒ Y . It is well known that if X and Y are metric spaces, x belongs to
X, y belongs to ϕ(x) and {xn}∞n=1 ⊆ X converges to x then, there exists a
corresponding sequence {yn}∞n=1 converging to y and with the property that
yn ∈ ϕ(xn) for all n ∈ N (see Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988, Theorem
AIII.2, p. 271)). Lemma 5 is the analog of this result when both X and Y
are topological spaces.
Lemma 5 Let X and Y be topological spaces and ϕ a lower hemicontinuous
correspondence from X to Y . Let {xj}j∈J be a net in X converging to x ∈ X
and y ∈ ϕ(x).
Then, there exists a subnet {x˜m}m∈M of {xj}j∈J and a corresponding net
{ym}m∈M such that ym ∈ ϕ(sm) for all m ∈M and ym → y.
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Proof. Let Vy be the set of all open neighborhoods of y, directed by ⊆.
Since ϕ is lower hemi-continuous, then for all V ∈ Vy there exists jV ∈ J
such that ϕ(xj) ∩ V 6= ∅ for all j º jV .
Define a function N : Vy × J → J by choosing, for all V ∈ Vy and j ∈ J ,
an element N(V, j) ∈ J satisfying N(V, j) º jV and N(V, j) º j. We direct
Vy × J by defining (V, j) º (V ′, j′) if and only if V ⊆ V ′ and j º j′. Define
x˜V,j = xN(V,j) for all (V, j) ∈ Vy × J .
It is clear that N is admissible. Indeed, if j ∈ J , we can consider (X, j) ∈
Vy × J , showing that (V ′, j′) º (X, j) implies that N(V ′, j′) º j′ º j.
Let V ∈ Vy and j ∈ J . Note that ϕ(x˜V,j)∩V 6= ∅ since x˜V,j = xN(V,j) and
N(V, j) º jV . Hence, choose yV,j ∈ ϕ(x˜V,j).
It remains to show that yV,j → y. Let V ∈ Vy. We can take an arbitrary
j0 ∈ J , and we have that yV ′,j′ ∈ V ′ ⊆ V for all (V ′, j′) º (V, j0).
Thus, let M = Vy × J and for all m ∈M , let x˜m = x˜V,j = xN(V,j), where
m = (V, j).
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